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Abstract
Does having a spouse influence an individual’s decision to start a firm and what firms
they create? The answer to this question is crucial for our understanding of how re-
cent changes to family composition influence firm creation. We develop a model of
endogenous entrepreneurship with spousal labour supply decisions and endogenous
marriage. Married individuals have three channels, that go in opposite directions,
which influence their choice to start a firm relative to the unmarried. Firstly, spouses
work less when the business is more profitable partially offsetting the benefit of higher
profits (spousal substitution effect). Secondly, if the business fails, the spouse works
more hours (spousal insurance effect). Finally, a married individual shares their in-
come with their spouse which decreases their income as a worker, their cost to en-
trepreneurship (spousal opportunity cost effect). We proceed to test empirically the
relative strength of these channels. The model is informative of the components of the
error term and the conditions for validity of our instrumental variable strategy. Using
city level variation in the past composition of immigrants we show higher marriage
rates are associated to more entry and lower average size of startups.
JEL-Codes : E24, E23, J63, J64
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1 Introduction
How does having a spouse affect the decision to start a firm? How does it affect the
type of firms created by individuals? The answer to this question is crucial if we wish
to understand how changes in household composition affect job creation. We know there
have been secular changes to household composition in the US and Canada. This is best
portrayed by the decline in marriage rates (from 59.71% in 1984 to 45.58% in 2013 for
Canada and from 62% in 1990 to 55% in 2013 for the US) and the rise of one person
households (from 20.3% in 1981 to 27.6% in 2011 for Canada and from 9% to 12% for the
US). To understand how these changes affected net job creation and productivity, we need
to know how they affected firm formation and the composition of new firms.1 Despite
the huge literature on entrepreneurship and firm formation2, there has been no research on
how marriage can affect both entry into entrepreneurship and firm size. This paper fills in
this gap.
To study the role of spouses on the entrepreneurship of the main earner we propose
a tractable model of endogenous entrepreneurship, endogneous marriage, endogenous
spousal labour supply, heterogeneity in innate entrepreneurial ability and business project
specific productivity. In the model, main earners choose ex-ante whether to marry based
on a taste for marriage, their innate entrepreneurial ability and the overall productivity of
the economy. Households can either be two persons or single person households. Main
earners in the household draw business opportunities from an exogenous distribution. In
equilibrium, individuals exhibit a threshold policy rule. For all business opportunities
with productivity above the optiomal threshold, the individual starts a firm. In two person
households, main earner and spouse share their income, such that the total consumption of
each individual depends on both their income and of their partner. Spouses maximize their
1Haltiwanger (2011), Haltiwanger et al. (2015), Diez et al. (2014) and Clementi and Palazzo (2016) study
the contribution of firm creation to productivity. Decker et al. (2014) highlight the strong contribution of
startups to job creation.
2See Lucas Jr (1978), Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994), Fonseca et al. (2001), Hurst and Lusardi (2004), Cagetti
et al. (2006), Quadrini (2000), Beaudry et al. (2018), Hamilton (2000) and Haltiwanger et al. (2013).
2
individual utility by choosing how many hours to work, given their wage and the income
of the main earner. Main earners make the individually optimal decision of whether or not
to start a firm taking into account their spouse’s optimal behaviour.
This tractable framework delivers three channels via which being a couple influences
the decision to start a firm. First, spouses work less when the main earner’s business is
more profitable partially offsetting the benefit of high profits (spousal substitution effect).
This channel makes entrepreneurship relatively less attractive to married individuals which
in turn become more selective on which business projects to implement.
Secondly, if the business fails, the spouse works more hours (spousal insurance effect).
This effect is a natural application of the concept of added worker effect vastly studied in
labor economics (See Lundberg (1985), Maloney (1987), Hyslop (2001), Stephens (2002),
Juhn and Potter (2007), Gallipoli and Turner (2009), Blundell et al. (2016), Blundell et al.
(2018), Wu and Krueger (2018)). This insurance channel decreases the cost of failure
for married individuals. This pushes a married person to become less selective in which
business projects to implement.
Finally, a married individual shares their income with their spouse which decreases
their income as a worker, their cost to entrepreneurship (spousal opportunity cost effect).
This channel is consistent with a growing literature studying the importance of the op-
portunity costs to entrepreneurship. This channel further pushes married individuals to
accepting less productive business opportunities. As a result, the total effect of having a
spouse on entry into entrepreneurship is ambiguous. The model predicts that if the spousal
insurance effect and the spousal opportunity cost effect dominate over the spousal substi-
tution effect than higher marriage rates induce higher entry rates into entrepreneurship and
lower average number of employees of new startups. If on the other hand, the spousal
substitution effect dominates over the other two effects, we expect higher marriage rates
to induce lower entry rates into entrepreneurship and higher average number of employees
of new startups.
This tells us that regardless of the which effect dominates the response of entry into
entrepreneurship and average startup size to marriage should be the inverse of each other.
Although the model predicts ambiguity concerning the response of entry rates into en-
trepreneurship to marriage it has a sharp prediction that marriage rates affect average size
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of startups in the opposite direction it affects entry rates. This is a key empirical impli-
cation as it directly relates to the selection mechanism behind the differences between
married and unmarried individuals in the model.
Next, we proceed to an empirical analysis with the goal of investigating the relative
strenghts of these different channels and testing the model’s empirical prediction. The em-
pirical approach we use is a structural-IV approach. We use the model to derive our instru-
ment and the conditions under which it provides consistent estimates of the coefficients of
interest. We estimate straightforward linear regressions using an instrument indicated from
the theory. This strategy fits with a literature that puts together structural modelling and
instrumental variable estimation (Blundell et al. (1998), Beaudry et al. (2012), Beaudry
et al. (2018), Tschopp (2015), Sand et al. (2016) and Green et al. (2017))). We focus on
estimating first order implications of the theory as implied by its linear approximation.
This offers a simple, clear and intuitive exposition of results. Our instrument derived from
the theory is the sum of changes in marriage of a immigrant group at the national level
weighted by the share of the population in the city of those immigrant groups. We find
that a 1% point increase in marriage rates is associated to 15.7% increase in the entry rate
into entrepreneurship and a 15.46% drop in the average size of startups.
These estimates allows us to perform a back of the enveloppe calculation of the re-
sponse of job creation to marriage rates. The results imply that a 1% increase in the
marriage induces a 0.24% increase in job creation. This number hides the importance of
taking into account the selection mechansim that imposes a negative relationship between
average size of startups and entry rates into entrepreneurship. In particular, if a researcher
does not taken into account the selection mechansim (ignores the response of the average
size of startups), they would wrongly conclude that a 1% point increase in the marriage
rate is associated to 15.7% increase in job creation. This serves as a word of caution for
policy analysis that ignores the impact on average size and focuses on the response of firm
entry. The result also highlights the importance of being explicit of the source of endo-
geneity and how to address it. Ignoring the endogeneity problem would also lead to a small
response of job creation. However, this would derive from the wrong conclusion that the
selection mechanism is not present. In reality, job creation does not respond exactly due to
the strong negative relationship between entry and average size generated by the selection
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mechanism.
One concern is that our results are being driven by borrowing constraints (more eas-
ily overcome by two people households) and/or spouses working in the business. We
verify our results are robust in both magnitude and significance to excluding high cap-
ital industries, firms created jointly by spouses and firms for which the spouse is listed
as an employee. This is consistent with our results not being driven by these alternative
channels.
The model relates to papers studying portofolio allocation of households composed
of an entrepreneur and a worker (Panousi (2008), Angeletos and Panousi (2009) and An-
geletos and Panousi (2011)). The key difference is that in these papers there is a fixed
composition of one entrepreneur and one worker. In our model, on the other hand, one
of the two agents beloging to the household is making endogenously the decision to enter
entrepreneurship. As a result, there are moments where both agents in the household are
workers while other moments where one is an entrepreneur and the other is a worker.
2 Model
In this section I go over the main model of the paper. The main objective is to derive the
key intuition of the different forces that come into play when an individual decides to start
a firm as a function of having a spouse or not. We start by describing individual choices
conditional on marriage and individual entrepreneurial ability θ. After having done that,
we describe the endogenous decision to marry as a function of entrepreneurial ability θ
and individual taste for marriage.
In the model we abstract from the possibility of the spouse helping out in the business
started by their partner. This assumption is consistent with our results in the empirical
section. In particular, we verify our empirical results are not being driven by firms started
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jointly by the couple or for which the spouse is listed as an employee of the firm. 3 We
also abstract from borrowing constraints. This is consistent with the evidence provided in
the empirical section where we show our results are robust to excluding industries that are
capital intensive.4
In the economy there are two types of households. Single individual households are
composed of only one individual who is also the main earner. The second type of house-
hold is that of couples. These are composed of one main earner and one spouse. There
is no savings and each household consumes their current income. We consider log utility.
There are no search frictions. All individuals searching for a job, find one instantaneously.
The utility derived from income I for the single person household is given by
log(I). (1)
For households composed of two individuals, there are two sources of income, one is the
income of the main earner I and the other is the income of the spouse wsh. The income
of the spouse is a function of how many hours the spouse chooses to optimally work h
and the wage paid to do so ws. To make the model tractable we consider the wage of the
spouse is paid by an outside sector not explicitly modelled.5 We consider a parametrization
where the wage of the main earner is larger than that of the spouse, ws < w. Although not
modelled here to keep the model tractable, this is consistent with our notion of the spouse
being the individual in the household that specializes on non-market activities.
3We also abstract from the benefit of entrepreneurs receiving employer provided health insurance via
their spouse. This choice is consistent with our data where such considerations are likely of second order
due to Canada’s public health care system.
4This is not to say that borrowing constraints are not important for decisions to start a firm. Rather, it
says that the differences in entrepreneurship caused by marriage do not seem to be driven by borrowing
constraint considerations.
5This can be thought of as not modelling the specific sectors that spouses tend to concentrate more
relative to main earners. This allows us to avoid the discussion on the source of lower wages among women
relative to men.
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Let χ denote the share of spousal income that is left for the spouse to consume and γ be the
share of main earner income that is left for the main earner to consume. Then the utility
of the spouse working h hours with a main earner of income I is given by
log(γI + χwsh) (2)
and the utility of the main earner in the couple is given by
log((1− γ)I + (1− χ)wsh). (3)
where γ and µ are such that 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ χ ≤ 1.6 Furthermore, let us assume 1
2−χ > γ.
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We abstract from the choice to start a firm or not for the spouse, so as to concentrate on
the main earner. The spouse faces the static problem of how many hours to work every
period. Given the income I of the main earner, the spouse maximizes his/her utility by
choosing how many hours h to work which are paid according to ws. There is also a
disutility associated to working for the spouse of φh. As a result, the spouse solves
max
0≤h≤1








when h is an interior solution and 0 or 1 when we get corner solutions. We focus on
parameter specifications where h always has an interior solution. Hence, it follows that
6Note that χ and γ imply that income from the spouse and from the main earner might not be perfect
substitutes in the utility function of an individual in the couple.
7This is a necessary condition to guarantee the value of being an entrepreneur is always increasing in
productivity of the business z.
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Let us consider the problem of a currently operating entrepreneur. Each main earner
has innate entrepreneurial ability of θ. The distribution of θ in for main earners of both
single and couple households is exogenous and equal to G(θ). Let also the productivity of
the firm be a function of a economy-wide productivity component y. In other words, y is
the same for all entrepreneurs in a same economy while θ is a individual ability compo-
nent that varies across entrepreneurs. The individual entrepreneur takes wages w and firm




yθeznα − wn (7)
which gives
















Once the entrepreneur start operating, firm productivity is fixed at θez. For the remainder
of this section we omit the dependance of value functions on θ to make the notation lighter.
With probability λ the firm fails and the individual goes bankrupt. What follows next
should be understood as conditional on a entrepreneurial ability θ. Let Jm(z) represent
the value of being an entrepreneur with a spouse, Bm the value of being bankrupt with a
spouse, then,
rJm(z) = log[(1− γ)π(z) + (1− χ)wsh(π(z), ws)] + λ(Bm − Jm(z)). (10)
where the flow utility of an entrepreneur depends on how much they get from their income,
(1 − γ)π(z), and how much they get from their spouse’s income, (1 − χ)wsh(π(z), ws).
Similarly, let Ju(z) represent the value of being an entrepreneur without a spouse, Bu the
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value of being bankrupt without a spouse, then,
rJu(z) = log[π(z)] + λ(Bu − Ju(z)). (11)
The difference between the value of being an entrepreneur between the two groups de-
pends on any differences in the value of being bankrupt Bm versus Bu and differences in
their flow utility. In particular, while the unmarried individual gets to keep all of profits,
the married individual needs to share some with the spouse. But, the married individual
also has the advantage of getting some of the income from the spouse. Note that the in-
come as an entrepreneur when unmarried is increasing in z.8 On the other hand, for the
married individual as their entrepreneurial profits, π(z) increase in z, hours worked by
the spouse, h, decrease. Hence, spousal income decreases partially offsetting some of the
increase in income due to higher profits. This is an important effect which we revisit later.
We call it the spousal substitution effect.
Once bankrupt the individual works as a wage worker but is forced to pay a cost c and
is not allowed to entrepreneurship. Hence, the income of the main earner in this case is
w − c. The individual exits bankruptcy back to the start of wage work with probability p.
Let Wm be the value of being a married wage worker, then the value of being bankrupt
married is
rBm = log[(1− γ)(w − c) + (1− χ)wsh((w − c), ws)] + p(Wm −Bm) (12)
where the flow utility of the bankrupt married individual depends on how much they get
from their own income (1 − γ)(w − c) and how much they get from their spouse income
(1 − χ)wsh((w − c), ws). Similarly, let W u denote the value of being a unmarried wage
worker, the the value of being bankrupt and unmarried, Bu is
rBu = log[w − c] + p(W u −Bu) (13)
8Recall that profits, π(z) is increasing in z.
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The difference in the value of being bankrupt between the two groups, depends on the
difference in continution values Wm versus W u and in differences in flow utility. In par-
ticular, while for unmarried individuals, income falls by the cost of bankruptcy c, married
individuals benefit from the income of the spouse. When the main earner is bankrupt, with
a lower income, spouses increase working hours h. The result is an increase in spousal
earning which partially offsets the decrease in income suffered by married bankrupt indi-
viduals. We call this effect the spousal insurance effect. We will revist it later.
Next, consider the value of being a wage worker when married Wm versus unmarried
W u. For both types of individuals, business projects arrive a rate ψ. Each project is
associated to a firm productivity z drawn from an exogenous distribution F (z). Individuals
choose optimally which projects to implement comparing the value of opening a firm
(Jm(z) if married and Ju(z) if unmarried) to the value of being a wage worker. Let zm
represent the firm productivity that makes the married individual between opening a firm
and continuing to work. Then,
Jm(zm) = Wm (14)
It follows the value of being a married wage worker is given by




The flow utility a married individual when working is given by how much they get from
their own income, (1 − γ)w, and how much they get from their spouse’s income, (1 −
χ)wsh(w,ws). Similarly, let zu represent the firm productivity that makes the married
individual indifferent between opening a firm and continuing to work. Then,
Ju(zu) = W u (16)
It follows the value of being a unmarried wage worker is given by





The difference in the value of being a wage worker between married and unmarried main
earners, depends on the difference in continuation values Jm(z) versus Ju(z) and in the
differences in flow utility. Furthermore, this flow utility as a worker represent the opportu-
nity cost to starting a firm. Intuitively, when an individual starts a firm they must forgo of
their current flow utility. For an unumarried individual the flow utility is given exclusively
by their income as a worker w. For the married main earner their utility depends on how
much they get from their income, (1 − γ)w, and how much they get from their spouse’s
income, (1− χ)wsh(w,ws). Note that since 0 ≤ h ≤ 1 and ws < w it follows that
log[(1− γ)w + (1− χ)wsh(w,ws)] < log[w]. (18)
Hence, the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship is larger for unmarried individuals relative
to married individuals. For all else equal, this increases the cost to enter entrepreneurship
for unmarried individuals relative to married individuals. We call this the spousal oppor-
tunity cost effect. This effect just comes from the fact that a married individual must
share their income with their spouse. In the case of a main earner who is a wage worker
this means a lower consumption than they would have otherwise had when unmarried.
However, since this represents the opportunity cost to entrepreneurship, it implies there is
a smaller cost for married individuals.
2.1 Equilibrium Measure of Entrepreneurs
Next, we solve for the equilibrium measure of entrepreneurs conditional on a share o
married individuals. Let M be the exogenous measure of married individuals in the econ-
omy. Let ηm(θ) be share of married individuals with entrepreneurial ability θ that are
entrepreneurs, em(θ), be the share of married individuals with entrepreneurial ability θ
that are workers and bm(θ) the share of married individuals with entrepreneurial ability θ
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that are bankrupt.9 Similarly define ηu(θ), eu(θ) and bu(θ) as the same corresponding share
for unmarried individuals. The share of entrepreneurs for both groups is characterized by
η̇i(θ) = ψ(1− F (zi(θ)))ei(θ)− ληi(θ), ∀i ∈ {m,u}. (19)
Similarly, the share of individuals bankrupt in both groups is characterized by
ḃi(θ) = ληi(θ)− pbi(θ), ∀i ∈ {m,u}. (20)
Finally, the share of workers in both groups is characterized by
ηi(θ) + bi(θ) + ei(θ) = 1, ∀i ∈ {m,u}. (21)
Setting η̇(θ) = 0 and ḃi(θ) = 0 and solving for these shares gives us
ei(θ) =
λp
λp+ ψ(1− F (zi(θ)))(p+ λ)
, ∀i ∈ {m,u}. (22)
bi(θ) =
ψ(1− F (zi(θ)))λ
λp+ ψ(1− F (zi(θ)))(p+ λ)
, ∀i ∈ {m,u}. (23)
ηi(θ) =
ψ(1− F (zi(θ)))p
λp+ ψ(1− F (zi(θ)))(p+ λ)
, ∀i ∈ {m,u}. (24)
Futhermore, the fraction of individuals i ∈ {m,u} (m = married, u = unmarried) of
productivity, ez with entrepreneurial ability θ, Γi(z, θ) is characterized by
Γ̇i(z, θ) = ψf(z)ei(θ)− λΓi(z, θ), ∀z ≥ zi(θ) i ∈ {m,u} (25)
9In other words, ηm(θ) + em(θ) + bm(θ) = 1.
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Using the expression for ei(θ) and setting Γ̇i(z, θ) = 0 we get
Γi(z, θ) =
ψf(z)p
λp+ ψ(1− F (zi(θ)))(p+ λ)
(26)
This implies the measure of firms of productivity θez, Λ(z, θ), of this economy is given by
Λ(z, θ) =
Mψf(z)pG(θ)




λp+ ψ(1− F (zu(θ)))(p+ λ)
1{z ≥ zu(θ)} (27)
where 1{z > a} is an indicator function equal to 1 if z > a and 0 otherwise, ∀a.10Hence,
the average firm productivity E[z] in this economy is given by












where E[z]m is the average productivity among firms created by married individuals and
E[z]u is the average productivity among firms created by unmarried individuals. From
this expression we can see that E[z] is increasing in M if zm > zu and decreasing oth-
erwise. It follows that relative selection of both groups (zm versus zu) is crucial for our
understanding of how changes in the marriage rate affect the firm productivity distribution.
2.2 Outcomes and Spouses
Given the three channels we discussed (spousal insurance effect, spousal substitution
effect and spousal opportunity cost effect), we are interested in how each of them affect
the entry into entrepreneurship and the size of new firms created among married versus un-
10In other words, Λ(z, θ) is defined such that
∫
Λ(z, θ)dz = MG(θ)ηm(θ) + (1−M)G(θ)ηu(θ).
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married individuals. In our model these objects are both captured by the selection thresh-
olds, zm for the married, and zu for the unmarried. The discussion that follows should be
understood as conditional on a value for θ. Once, we bring model to the data we discuss
how our identification strategy deals with the endogeneity problem associated to the pres-
ence of θ.
The entry rate into entrepreneurship for both groups is determined respectively by
ψ(1− F (zm)) (28)
and
ψ(1− F (zu)). (29)
From the expressions above we see that a higher treshold decreases the entry rate of the
corresponding group. Let us define as startups firms that have just started. Then, given the
exogenous distribution F (z) from where business projects are drawn, the average size of














































Hence, we conclude that average size of startups for a group (married versus unmarried) is
increasing in the treshold chosen by that group. To summarize, if we want to know whether
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married individuals enter more or less and create smaller or larger firms than unmarried
individual then we must uncover the relationship between their productivity tresholds :
zm ≶ zu? (34)
To answer this question let us look separately at the effect of each difference in value
function across married and unmarried individuals. In particular, we are going to consider
separately, the effect of having the spouse work when the individual is a worker, when the
individual is an entrepreneur and when the individual is bankrupt. As we shall see these
will all have separate effects on the decision of an individual to start a firm relative to when
unmarried.
With this purpose let us first consider the extreme case where the spouse of the married
individual only works when the individual is an operating entrepreneur. In this case the
value of being an entrepreneur for the married M and unmarried U are given by
rJm(z) = log[(1− γ)π(z) + (1− χ)wsh(π(z))] + λ(Bm − Jm(z)) (35)
and
rJu(z) = log[π(z)] + λ(Bu − Ju(z)). (36)
The value of being bankrupt for the married and unmarried would be given by
rBm(z) = log[w − c] + p(Wm −Bm(z)) (37)
and
rBu(z) = log[w − c] + p(W u −Bu(z)). (38)
Finally the value of being an entrepreneur for the married and unmarried would be given
by
rW u = log[w] + ψ
∫
zu
(Ju(z)−W u)dF (z) (39)
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and




In this case, we see that the only difference between married and unmarried individuals is
that for married individuals they get an additional income when an entrepreneur, however,
this additional income of the spouse is decreasing in the productivity of the firm. To see
this, recall that the hours worked by the spouse are a decreasing function of the income of
the main earner. Hence, a higher profit of the firm of the main earner, decreases the hours
worked by the spouse. If we take the derivative with respect to firm productivity z of the




u′((1− γ)π(z) + (1− χ)wsh)[(1− γ)∂π(z)
∂z







































In other words, the value of being an entrepreneur is increasing in the productivity of the








11To see that the derivative is positive note that 12−χ > γ ⇒ 1− 2γ + χγ > 0.
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It follows that the derivative of the value of being an entrepreneur is increasing with
productivity for both married and unmarried individuals, however, the slope is different
between both individuals. Crucially whether or not the slope for a married entrepreneur is
larger or not depends on whether
u′((1− γ)π(z) + (1− χ)wsh)[1− 2γ + χγ] ≶ u′(π(z)). (47)
which is equivalent to
1− 2γ + χγ





given u(c) = log(c). This simplifies to
−π(z)γ + χγπ(z) ≶ (1− χ)wsh (49)
−π(z)γ(1− χ) < wsh(1− χ) (50)
It follows married individuals have a smaller slope for the value of being an entrepreneur,
J(z), to productivity z relative to unmarried individuals. Intuitively, this comes from the
fact that as the individual becomes richer (by starting a higher productivity business project
z) the spouse works less. This partially offsetts the increase in household income. Hence,
the benefit of a marginal increase in productivity for a married entrepreneur is smaller
than for a unmarried entrepreneur. This is the spousal substitution effect we talked about
before. All else equal, this pushes married persons to be more selective on which business
projects to implement (higher zmw ) relative to unmarried individuals. The result is a lower
entry rate, higher average productivity and higher average size among firms created by
married individuals.
Next, let us consider the situation where the spouse of the married individual only works
when the main earner is bankrupt. In this case the value of being an entrepreneur for the
married M and unmarried U are given by
rJm(z) = u(π(z)) + λ(Bm − Jm(z)) (51)
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and
rJu(z) = u(π(z)) + λ(Bu − Ju(z)). (52)
The value of being bankrupt for the married and unmarried would be given by
rBm = u(w − c) + p(Wm −Bm(z)) (53)
and
rBu = u((1− γ)(w − c) + (1− χ)wsh) + p(W u −Bu(z)). (54)
Finally the value of being an entrepreneur for the married and unmarried would be given
by
rW u = u(w) + ψ
∫
zu
(Ju(z)−W u)dF (z) (55)
and




In this case we see that the only difference between the two individuals is their value of
being bankrupt. In particular, for the married individual, bankruptcy is a less painful, be-
cause they can rely on the income of their spouse, as long as c is sufficiently large.12 As
a result, when the spouse of the individual only works when the individual is bankrupt
the effect is additional insurance for the married individual that decides to become an en-
trepreneur. This makes entrepreneurship more attractive for married individuals for any
productivity level z. This is the spousal insurance effect that we talked about before. This
channel makes married main earners less selective in which business project to implement
12Formally, we need




This condition is found using the optimal solution for h as a function of the income of the main earner I ,
here equal to w − c. We then find the condition for c to guarantee that
(1− γ)(w − c) + (1− χ)(wsh(ws, w − c) > w − c. (58)
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(decrease zm relative to zu). The result is a higher entry rate and a lower average produc-
tivity among firms created by married individuals. Already now we see that there are two
effects going in opposite directions. Hence, whether married individuals enter more or less
relative to unmarried individuals depends crucially on the strength of these two effects.
Finally let us consider the case where the spouse in a couple only works when the main
earner is a wage worker. In this case, the value of being an entrepreneur and being bankrupt
between married and unmarried individuals J(z), B would be the same conditional on the
value of being a worker. Then the value of being an entrepreneur for the married and
unmarried would be written as
rJm(z) = log[π(z)] + λ(Bm − Jm(z)) (59)
and
rJu(z) = log[π(z)] + λ(Bu − Ju(z)). (60)
The value of being bankrupt for the married and unmarried is given by
rBm = log[w − c] + p(Wm −Bm(z)) (61)
and
rBu = log[w − c] + p(W u −Bu(z)). (62)
Finally the value of being an entrepreneur for the married and unmarried is given by
rW u = log[w] + ψ
∫
zu
(Ju(z)−W u)dF (z) (63)
and




From this set of six equations we see that the only difference between the two type of
individuals is that the married individual has a different household income when a worker
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relative to the unmarried. Any difference in the value of being an entrepreneur or bankrupt
must come from this difference in income when working. Furthermore, note that since,
ws < w and 0 ≤ h ≤ 1, it follows that w > wsh, ∀h. Hence, the married worker has a
smaller income relative to the unmarried worker. The reason for this is that the married
worker shares a part of their income with their spouse which earns less. Since the in-
come earned as a worker respresents the outside option of the entrepreneur, this represents
a higher opportunity cost to entrepreneurship for the unmarried individual. As a conse-
quence, if for married individuals, their spouses only work when they were workers this
would imply they would be less selective than unmarried individuals since their opportu-
nity cost to entrepreneurship would be lower. This is our spousal opportunity cost effect
which we talked about previously. It pushes the married individual to be less selective in
which business projects to implement (decreases zw). The result is a higher entry rate and
a lower average size among firms created by married individuals.
We conclude that relative to unmarried individuals, married people face three addi-
tional effects that influence their decision to start a firm. The first is the spousal oppor-
tunity cost effect. This comes from the fact that when starting a firm, married persons
sacrifice a lower income (lower opportunity cost). This comes from the fact that married
individuals need to share some of their income with their spouse. In the case where they are
earning more then their spouse such as when a wage worker this implies a smaller income
for the individual. This in turn represents a lower opportunity cost to entrepreneurship
which pushes married pesons to be less selective on which business projects to implement
(higher zm relative to unmarried individuals, zu).The second effect is what we call the
spousal insurance effect. This comes from the insurance married individuals have due
to the possibility of their spouse working more hours when they go bankrupt. This makes
entrepreneurship relatively more attractive to married individuals relative to unmarried
persons. This pushes down the selection in business projects among the married (lower
zm) relative to the unmarried (zu). Finally, the spousal substitution effect refers to how
the slope of the value of being an entrepreneur as a function of productivity z is smaller
for married individuals. This is coming from the fact that as a main earner becomes richer
the spouse decreases their labor supply partially offsetting the total increase in household
income. This effect decreases the average value of entrepreneurship for married persons.
20
As a consequence they become more selective on which business projects to implement
(higher zmw ).
This tractable framework tells us that whether married individuals enter more or less
into entrepreneurship and whether they open larger or smaller firms crucially depends on
which of these effects dominates. In the next section I go over the data and the empirical
strategy used to test the strength of these different channels. It is important to note that al-
though the model implies an ambiguos response of entry rates and average size of startups
to changes in marriage rates and spousal wages it imposes the restriction that any variable
that changes the entry rate into entrepreneurship must change the average size of startups
in the opposite direction. This comes from the model restriction that we are identifying
changes in average startup size due to changes in the selection of business projects upon
entry. As shall become clear, this restriction holds in the data.
Before proceeding to the data analysis we consider the endogenous decision to marry.
This is important since it will make clear the same source of endogeneity that needs to be
overcome to estimate the effect of marriage on entrepreneurship.
2.3 Endogenous decision to marry
Up until now we have considered the marital status of an individual as exogenous. In this
section, we formalize the decision of individuals to marry or not. The objective is not
to provide a full detailed theory of the formation and dissolution of marriage but rather
to inform us how entrepreneurial ability θ and economy wide productivity y affect both
marriage and entrepreneurial outcomes. This is an important point given our desire to
empirically estimate the effect of marriage on entrepreneurship. As shall be clear in this
section any empirical analysis must take into account the endogeneity problem caused by
entrepreneurial ability and economy wide productivity.
With this objective in mind we consider a simple form of endogenous marriage forma-
tion. Ex-ante, individuals choose to marry based on the expected value of being married
and unmarried. In particular, individuals make this choice under the veil of ignorance,
before knowledge of whether they enter or not entrepreneurship. They weigh each state
by the measure of individuals of same entrepreneurial ability as themselves in each state.
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Furthermore, each individual belongs to a group g.13 Each group g has a idyossincratic
utility value of vg associated to being married. Let vg ∼ H(v). Hence, the ex-ante value
of marriage V M(θ, g) for an individual of ability θ from group g is
V M ≡ em(θ)WM(θ) + bm(θ)BM(θ) +
∫
zm(θ)
J(z, θ)ΓM(z, θ)dz + vg. (65)
The ex-ante value of being unmarried, V U(θ, g) for an individual of ability θ from group
g is
V U ≡ eu(θ)WU(θ) + bu(θ)BU(θ) +
∫
zu(θ)
J(z, θ)ΓU(z, θ)dz. (66)












J(z, θ)ΓU(z, θ)dz. (67)
Let Pr(M = 1) be the probability an individual chooses to marry then
Pr(M = 1) = Pr(V M > V U). (68)
Taking a first order log-linearization of the set of value functions for θ and y both around
1 gives us the probability as a linear function of individual entrepreneurial ability, θ, econ-
omy specific productivity y and tast for marriage vg. The proposition below states this
formally.
Proposition 1. The probability to marry Pr(M = 1) is characterized by
Pr(M = 1) = γ0 + γ1log(θ) + γ2log(y) + γvvg. (69)
13Later when we go to the data this will be individuals of different countries of origin.
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The proposition above makes explicit that the decision to marry is a function of the en-
trepreneurial ability of an individual, the economy specific productivity and their taste for
marriage. Intuitively, a higher entrepreneurial ability increases the individual’s incentive
to start a firm which in turn makes the effect of marriage on the value of entrepreneurship
more important for these individuals. This intuition also makes clear that entrepreneurial
ability affects both the decision to start a firm conditional on marital status as well as the
decision to marry. Similarly, in productive economies (with higher y), individuals are more
prone to start a firm. But this in turn makes the differences in the value of entrepreneurship
between married and unmarried all the more important for this individual. As a result, a
change in y affects both the decision to start a firm conditional on marriage but also the
decision to marry. It follows that a naive regression of entry into entrepreneurship on mar-
riage suffers from endogeneity due to both y and θ. When we bring the model to the data
we implement a strategy to overcome this endogeneity problem. Crucially, we propose an
instrument that captures variation in vg to identify changes in Pr(M = 1) uncorrelated to
the decision to start a firm.
When we bring the model to the data we will consider variation across local economies.
In particular, we consider each local economy-time period pair to be described by the
model layed out in this section. In line with this logic, Proposition 2 below derives the
marriage rate of an economy as a function of the weighted sum of the marriage rate of
different groups g in the economy. It makes clear that in fact vg can be captured by this
weighted sum of the marriage rate of different groups g in the economy.
Proposition 2. Suppose there exists a large number of economies c all of which are char-
acterized by the model described in this section. Let ηj,c,t be the share of individuals
of group j in the economy c at year t, G(θ) be the unconditional distribution of en-
trepreneurial ability θ in economy c, Gc(θ|g) be the distribution of entrepreneurial ability
θ conditional on being from group g in economy c and πc,j,t be the share of individuals of
group j located in the economy c at year t. Then, the aggregate marriage rate MR in the
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In this section I go over the main empirical strategies used to disentangle the relative
strengths of each channel spouses affect the individual’s decision to start a firm. The
strategy uses variation across cities. Intuitively, consider each city as a local economy
described by our model in the previous section. Then Proposition 2 informs us that a
natural candidate for an instrument for marriage rates is any variation in∑
∀g
ηg,c,tMRg,t (71)
which is uncorrelated to heterogeneity in unobserved entrepreneurial ability
∫
log(θ)dGc(θ)
and the economy wide productivity log(yc,t).
Furthemore, our source of variation allow us to test the model prediction that the effect
of marriage on the entry rate into entrepreneurship must have the opposite sign of the
effect of marriage on the average size of startups. This restriction comes directly from
our selection mechanism, in which firm heterogeneity is being driven by entry decision of
entrepreneurs. To our knowledge this is the first paper to empirically test this restriction
of firm selection mechanisms.
We focus on men between 25 and 65 years old to focus on individuals with high labor
market attachment. Our main objective is to verify which effect from the theory (spousal
insurance effect, spousal opportunity cost effect and spousal substitution effect) is
strongest. To verify this we use variation across different cities in Canada. Let c denote
city, t year then the entry into entrepreneurship ERc,t can be written as a function of the
marriage rate of that city MRc,t
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Proposition 3. Suppose there exists a large number of economies c all of which are char-
acterized by the model described in the previous section. Then, the entry rate into en-
trepreneurship and the average size of startups in each of these c economies can be written
as



















The components εf,sc and ε
f,e
c represent city specific comparative advantages that in-
duce permanent differences across cities in entrepreneurship. In our model these come
from different distributions in entrepreneurial ability across cities Gc(θ) but fixed over
time. εec,t and ε
s
c,t represent city specific characteristics not fixed over time that influence
entrepreneurship. In our model, these are city specific productivities yc,t that varies over
time. The possible presence of different entrepreneurial ability distributions across cities
Gc(θ) (captured by εf,sc and ε
f,e
c ) create an endogeneity problem. In order to eliminate this
source of endogeneity we take first differences. Finally, to allow for national level trends
in the change in entry into entrepreneurship and the average size of startups we include
year dummies 1{year = t}t. It follows our specifications become
∆ERc,t = γ0,1 + γ1,1∆MRc,t + 1{year = t}t + ∆εec,t (76)
and
∆SYc,t = γ0,2 + γ1,2∆MRc,t + 1{year = t}t + ∆εsc,t. (77)
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2.4.1 Endogeneity
The specifications above could be estimated with OLS, however they still suffer from
endogeneity. In particular, if εec,t and ε
s
c,t represent city specific productivity yc,t then ac-
cording to our model we expect this to influence both marriage decisions and decisions to
start a firm. Intuitively, individuals that expect to start a firm (due to high yc,t) are more








c,t) 6= 0. (79)
To resolve this issue we use an instrumental variable strategy for ∆MRc,t based on our
model. In what follows we explain our strategy.
2.4.2 Instrument for Marriage Rates
The instrument we consider uses variation in the distribution of immigrant groups across
cities and the variation in marriage rate across these different groups14. If we use the


























14Groups are defined by country of birth of the individuals. Individuals born in Canada are included as a
separate group
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where ηg,c,1 is the share of individuals of group j in the economy c at the first year of the
sample and MRg,1 is the marriage rate of group g at the first year of the sample. For our
instrument we consider the term ∑
∀g
ηg,c,1∆MRg,t. (82)
Intuitively, in our model the variation in this instrument comes from variation in the taste
for marriage across groups over time, ∆vg,t, and the composition of each city in terms of













































c,t = 0. (84)
where we can take out ∆MRg,t from the sum because it is at the group level.



















c,t = 0. (86)
This happens if city specific productivity changes ∆log(yc,t) are uncorrelated to the
group composition of cities at the first year of the sample.15
15Although not present in our model, we could imagine different groups g have different time varying
taste for entrepreneurship. Our identification strategy here allows for the possibility that this taste for en-
trepreneurship correlates with the taste for marriage. What it doesn’t allow is for the change in the group g
specific taste for entrepreneurship to be correlated to changes in group g specific taste for marriage.
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Finally, as robustness to our main specifications we consider controlling for changes
in the share of men 25− 40 years old, ∆Share25−40c,t , the share of men 41− 55 years old,
∆Share41−55c,t , the share of men 56 − 65 years old, Share56−65c,t , change in the share of
children16, Sharechildrenc,t and change in the share of total employment in the current em-
ployment in the oil, gas and mining sector Shareoilc,t .
17 The point estimates are unchanged
when adding these controls.18
3 Data and Empirical Results
In this section we go over the data we use and our empirical results.
3.1 Data and Measurement
The data used for the empirical analysis is the Canadian Employer-Employee Dynamics
Database (CEEDD). It contains the entire universe of Canadian tax filers, and privately
owned incorporated firms. The dataset links employees to firms and firms to their corre-
sponding owners across space and time. This is achieved by linking individual tax infor-
mation (T1 files, individual tax returns), with linked employer-employee information (T4
files)19 and firm ownership and structure information (T2 files).20 The data is annual and is
available from 2001 to 2010. This constitutes an advantage relative to employer-employee
16Individuals with less than 15 years old
17This last variable is important, since during the period Canada was experiencing an important oil boom.
18Results with the controls are available upon request from the author.
19According to Canadian law, each employer must file a T4 file for each of her employees. The equivalent
in the US is the W-2, Wage and Tax Statement. In this form, the employer identifies herself, identifies the
employee and reports the labour earnings of the employee.
20T2 forms are the Canadian Corporate Income Tax forms. In the T2 files there is the schedule 50 in
which each corporation must list all owners with at least 10% of ownership. This allows me to link each
firm to individual entrepreneurs. The equivalent in the US to the schedule 50 of the T2 form is the schedule
G of 1120 form (Corporate Income Tax Form in the US)
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firm population data from the US, which does not allow the researcher to identify the
owners of the firm.
The data is annual with information on all employers and any businesses an individual
owned in a given year. Using this database, I can examine the characteristics of both the
business owner and the firm. I concentrate on firms that contribute to job creation by hiring
employees. This is done by focusing on employers instead of self-employed individuals.
Business owners are identified as individuals present in the schedule 50 files from the
T2 that have employees. Wage workers are identified as those who are not entrepreneurs
and report a positive employment income on their T4. I use the information in the T1 files
to control for characteristics such as gender, age and marital status. Finally, the dataset
is also linked to immigrant landing files allowing me to observe country of birth of the
individual.
The linkage between each firm and its corresponding owner is only available for pri-
vately owned incorporated firms. Incorporated firms have two key characteristics which
correspond closely to how economists typically think about firms : limited liability and
separate legal identity. Furthermore, there is a growing literature showing that incor-
porated firms tend to be larger and that they are more likely to contribute to aggregate
employment.21 There is also evidence that there is little transition from unincorporated
to incorporated status.22 These facts, highlight how incorporated firms with employees
are the most appropriate measure of firms to consider if we are interested in the interplay
21Glover and Short (2010) document that incorporated entrepreneurs operate larger businesses, accumu-
late more wealth, and are on average more productive than unincorporated entrepreneurs. Chandler (1977)
and Harris (2000) argue that over time the incorporated business structure was created with the explicit goal
of fostering investment in large, long gestation, innovative and risky activities.
22Levine and Rubinstein (2017) show that there is little transition from unincorporated to incorporated
status. They also show that the observed earnings increase for incorporated business owners does not take
place before opening the business, indicating that incorporation is not just a result of higher earnings, rather,
people choose the firm structure based on their planned business activity. The authors demonstrate how
the often cited puzzle, that entrepreneurs earn less than they would have as salaried workers, is no longer
true once we consider incorporated business owners. Together with other patterns of income dynamics and
observable characteristics of owners, the authors highlight how incorporated businesses are closer to firms
in traditional macro models.
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between entrepreneurship and the aggregate economy.23
For the remainder of the paper, the empirical definition of an entrepreneur is an owner
and founder of a privately owned incorporated firm with employees.
Besides the CEEDD we also use data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) for Canada.
We use the LFS to construct industry premia at the national level using hourly wages.
These industry premia are used for the construction of our second instrument for marriage
rates at the city level. From these datasets we construct city year level objects for our
regressions.
3.1.1 Results
In this section I present the main results of our specifications. Column 1 of Table 1 presents
the OLS results for our entry rate specification. We see that marriage rates are insignificant
if we don’t instrument for it. Column 2 for our entry rate specification once we instrument
marriage rates by our instrument IVc,t. The results indicate that a 1% point increase in
the marriage rate is associated to a 0.15% point increase in the entry probability into en-
trepreneurship. Given the benchmark entry rate of 1%, this corresponds to a 15% increase
in the entry probability. The results are robust to including additional controls (changes
in the share of men 25 − 40 years old, ∆Share25−40c,t , the share of men 41 − 55 years
old, ∆Share41−55c,t , the share of men 56 − 65 years old, Share56−65c,t , change in the share
of children24, Sharechildrenc,t and change in the share of total employment in the current
employment in the oil, gas and mining sector Shareoilc,t). The point estimate and the sig-
nificance are unchanged when adding these controls.25 Finally, Row 2 indicates the results
with are robust to including additional controls.
23Another reason to focus on incorporated firms with employees is Canadian corporte law. In Canada
there are significant tax advantages for incorporating as a higher earner. So to exclude from my analysis
high-earning workers that incorporate exclusively due to tax purposes, I focus on incorporated firms with
employees.
24Individuals with less than 15 years old
25Results with the controls are available upon request from the author.
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Next, we turn to the results on average size of firms. Column 1 of Table 2 indicates mar-
riage, ∆MRc,t has no effect on the average size of startups in the city if not instrumented
for. Column 2 of Table 2 shows results for average size of startups once we instrument
marriage rates by our instrument IVc,t. The results indicate that a 1% point increase in the
marriage rate is associated to a 15% decrease in the average size of startups. The results
are robust to including additional controls (changes in the share of men 25 − 40 years
old, ∆Share25−40c,t , the share of men 41 − 55 years old, ∆Share41−55c,t , the share of men
56−65 years old, Share56−65c,t , change in the share of children26, Sharechildrenc,t and change
in the share of total employment in the current employment in the oil, gas and mining sec-
tor Shareoilc,t). The point estimate and the significance are unchanged when adding these
controls.27 Finally, Row 2 indicates the results with are robust to including additional
controls.
These results are consistent with the prediction of our model that the group (married
vs unmarried) with the highest entry rate into entrepreneurship has the lower average size
of startups.28
26Individuals with less than 15 years old
27Results with the controls are available upon request from the author.
28These opposing predictions for entry and average size are an immediate consequence of the selection
mechanism in our model. Hence, the empirical results are consistent with difference between married and
unmarried individuals being driven by difference in selection upon entry into entrepreneurship.
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Significance IV for ∆MRc,t - Yes
Observations 836 836
Notes: Regressions of changes in the entry rate into en-
trepreneurship in economic region c and year t, ∆ERc,t, on
the change in the marriage rate in economic region c year t,
∆MRc,t. Column 1 reports OLS results. Column 2 reports
results when using our instrument for marriage rates. Our in-
strument is the sum of the share of individuals from group g in
a economic region c in the first year of the sample multiplied
by the change in marriage rate of individual at group g at the
national level in year t. Both specifications include year dum-
mies to capture national trends. * represents 10% significance,
** represents 5% significance and *** represents 1% signifi-
cance. Standard errors are clustered at the economic region c
level.
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Significance IV for ∆MRc,t - Yes
Observations 836 836
Notes: Regressions of changes in the average number of em-
ployees of startups in economic region c and year t, ∆ERc,t,
on the change in the marriage rate in economic region c year
t, ∆MRc,t. Startups are defined as firms that are at most 1
year old. Column 1 reports OLS results. Column 2 reports
results when using our instrument for marriage rates. Our in-
strument is the sum of the share of individuals from group g in
a economic region c in the first year of the sample multiplied
by the change in marriage rate of individual at group g at the
national level in year t. Both specifications include year dum-
mies to capture national trends. * represents 10% significance,
** represents 5% significance and *** represents 1% signifi-
cance. Standard errors are clustered at the economic region c
level.
4 Discussion on Alternative Mechanisms
The theoretical model is purposely tractable to keep the intuition clear and concise. How-
ever, there are other economic mechanisms affecting entrepreneurship in real life not
present in the model. In particular, spouse might help individuals overcome borrowing
constraints via wealth sharing or faster wealth accumulation.
In this line of thought, there are two ways borrowing constraints affects outcomes
for an individual considering starting a firm. The first is that individuals are constrained
in the scale of the firm they create. If married individuals on average are wealthier we
expect higher marriage rates to be associated to higher average size of startups. This is
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the opposite of what we find. The second way borrowing constraints might matter is if
there are substantial startup costs to opening a firm. This is an alternative narrative for
our results that marriage rates induce higher entry rates into entrepreneurship. To verify
our findings are not being driven by this channel we check that our results are robust
to excluding business starts in high capital demanding sectors.29 This robustness check
alleviates the concern that our results are being driven by borrowing constraint concerns.
Another potential mechanism ignored by the model is the possibility of joint en-
trepreneurship by both main earner and spouse. In particular, married individuals can
be more likely to start a firm because they have the option of starting with their spouse
which also contributes to running the business. Of course this is inherently hard to mea-
sure. But to the extent that a couple running together a firm are both listed as owners of the
business or has the spouse as employee of the firm, we can verify our results are robust to
excluding these types of businesses. Indeed, we verify that our results continue to hold, in
both magnitude and significance once we exclude firms started jointly by both main earner
and spouse and firms for which the spouse is listed an employee.
Both of these robustness checks are available upon request from the author.
5 Implications for Job Creation
Given our results for the response of average size of startups and entry rate into en-
trepreneurship to marriage rates, we can calculate the resulting change in job creation
due to a change in marriage rates. In particular, let Esc,t represent total employment among
startups at city c year t, then
log(Esc,t) = log(ERc,t) + log(SYc,t). (87)
29In particular, we exclude entries into Oil, Mining, Gas, Utilities, Manufacturing, Wholesale Trade,
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Using our estimate of 0.157 for ∆ERc,t
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= 15.7 . (90)
Hence, we conclude that for a 1% point increase in the marriage rate total employment
among startups increases by 0.24% points.30 They key take away from this exercise is
the importance of taking into account the selection mechanism when talking about job
creation. If a researcher had ignored the selection mechanism, inducing a fall in average
size of startups, they might conclude wrongly that a 1% increase in the marriage rate
induces a 15.7% increase in employment. This point is more general than the particular
mechanism of this paper of marriage and entrepreneurship. Futhermore, this highlights as
well the importance of being explicit in the form of endogeneity and the solution to it. If
a researcher ignored the endogeneity problem, they might wrongly infer that job creation
responds little to changes in the marriage rate as a result of small responses of both entry
and average size of startups.31 Here, on the other hand, the small response of job creation
comes exactly because of the strong negative relationship between average size and entry
generated by the selection mechanism.
30This just comes from 15.7%− 15.46%.
31Tables 1 and 2 tell us that if we ignore the endogeneity problem we would conclude that the effect of
marriage on both entry and average size is not stastifcally different than zero.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we explore for the first time the importance of spouses for an individdual’s
decision to start a firm. Through a tractable model we show that spouses affect the decision
through different opposing channels. Using this same model we derive empirical specifi-
cations and a instrumental variable that allow us to bring the model to the data. We show
that marriage is associated to larger entry into entrepreneurship and lower average size of
startup. This is consistent with the importance of the insurance provided by the spouse in
case of business failure. We also verify our results are robust to alternative mechanisms
such as borrowing constraints or spouses working in the business.
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Proof of Proposition 1.
For the first part of this proof I show how to obtain an equation defining thresholds zM
and zU .
Define uxS as the flow utility an individual receives when married or unmarried (x ∈
{u,m}) and in State S, where S ∈ {W,B, J) and uxJ(z) represents the value of being
i ∈ {u,m} when running a firm of productivity z. Now note the fact that, in equilibrium,
zM and zU are defined by
JU(zU) = WU (91)
JW (zW ) = WM . (92)
















r + ψ(1− F (zx))
(95)
Using the expression for Jx(z) and using Jx(zx) = W x we get







(r + λ)(r + p)
− rW
x(r + p+ λ)
(r + p)(r + λ)
(96)
Now after some algebra we find
rW x =
(r + p)(r + λ)uxW




uxJ(z)(r + p)dF (z)
(r + λ)(r + p) + r(r + p+ λ)ψ(1− F (zx))
+
ψ(1− F (zx))λuxB




If we replace this expression for rW x in Equation 109 we find equations defining each
treshold zx as a function of parameters and y and θ. Using these optimal expression for
each threshold we can log-linearize zM and zU , y and θ around the point (z∗, z∗, 1, 1)
which gives
log(zM) = ζM0 + ζ
M
1 log(y) + ζ
M
2 log(θ) (98)
log(zU) = ζU0 + ζ
U
1 log(y) + ζ
U
2 log(θ). (99)
Next, we log-linearize Pr(M = 1) for zM , zU , y, θ, vg around the point (z∗, z∗, 1, 1, 0).
Finally, we replace log(zM) and log(zU) by their expressions given by Equations (98) and
(99) to arrive at the desired result.
Pr(M = 1) = γ0 + γ1log(θ) + γ2log(y) + γvvg. (100)
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let there be a large number of economies c characterized by the model described in
the paper. Let ηj,c,t be the share of individuals of group j in the economy c at year t, G(θ)
be the unconditional distribution of entrepreneurial ability θ in economy c, Gc(θ|g) be the
distribution of entrepreneurial ability θ conditional on being from group g in economy c
and πc,j,t be the share of individuals of group j located in the economy c at year t. Then if
we aggregate Equation (69) at the economy wide level we obtain
MRc,t = γ0 + γ1
∫




If we aggregate Equation (69) at the group g level we obtain





πc,g,tlog(yc,t) + γvvg,t (102)
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Proof of Proposition 3.
For the first part of this proof I show how to obtain an equation defining thresholds zM
and zU . For this first part I omit subscripts c for economy c, t for time and i for individual
to avoid a heavy notation. After this first part, I use the appropriate subscripts to denote
what varies at individual level and what varies at the economy level. Each economy c
differs exclusively in their aggregate productivity component y and the distribution of en-
trepreneurial ability G(θ).
Define uxS as the flow utility an individual receives when married or unmarried (x ∈
{u,m}) and in State S, where S ∈ {W,B, J) and uxJ(z) represents the value of being
i ∈ {u,m} when running a firm of productivity z. Now note the fact that, in equilibrium,
zM and zU are defined by
JU(zU) = WU (104)
JW (zW ) = WM . (105)
















r + ψ(1− F (zx))
(108)
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Using the expression for Jx(z) and using Jx(zx) = W x we get







(r + λ)(r + p)
− rW
x(r + p+ λ)
(r + p)(r + λ)
(109)
Now after some algebra we find
rW x =
(r + p)(r + λ)uxw




uxJ(z)(r + p)dF (z)
(r + λ)(r + p) + r(r + p+ λ)ψ(1− F (zx))
+
ψ(1− F (zx))λuxB
r(r + p)(r + λ) + r(r + λ+ p)ψ(1− F (zx))
.
(110)
If we replace this expression for rW x in Equation 109 we find equations defining each
treshold zx as a function of parameters and y and θ. Using these optimal expression for
each threshold, for each household i in economy c we can log-linearize zMi,c,t, z
U
i,c,t, yc,t and












1 log(yc,t) + ζ
U
2 log(θi). (112)



































Next, log linearize both these expression for (zMi,c,t, z
U
i,c,t, yc,t, θi,MRc,t) around (z
∗, z∗, 1, 1, M̂).
Then replace log(zMi,c,t) and log(z
U
i,c,t) by their expressions given by Equations (111) and
(112). Finally, aggregate the expressions to the city level to obtain




















εec,t = γ1,ylog(yc,t) (119)
ε2c,t = γ2,ylog(yc,t) (120)
and
εf,ec = γθ,1
∫
log(θ)dGc(θ) (121)
εf,2c = γθ,2
∫
log(θ)dGc(θ). (122)
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